The Bodily Continuity Criterion Philosophy Essay

The Bodily continuity Criterion Philosophy EssayIn this chapter I will salute that the bodily criterion alone is not comfortable for continuation of identity, by describing the limits of accept adequate somatogenetic change. However, I will also show that around tier of physical continuation is necessary, such as a persons communicable make-up.Some materialist philosophers (such as Eric Olsen) gift selected that the physical personify is the seat of the identity. This realize claims that as hanker as one keeps the comparable torso passim their smell, they ar guaranteed to maintain their unique identity.This approach makes identifying selves clear and simple, as we faeces identify the exact spatio-temporal location of each self, as well as the starts and ends of selves. So, for example, if someone commits a crime, we can easily establish whether they are culpable or not by evidence such a fingerprints and pick up testimony. As long as their bole committed the cr ime, we are able to punish them for it.Criticisms, foundericularly in light of change over dateThere is a lot of op rank to the bring in that our identity should be limited to just the physical body. This position is contrary to almost religions, which view our immaterial mortals as intrinsic to our identities. The religious conception of a soul angles to be like that of consciousness, and some religions, such as Judeo-Christian religions, claim that this part of us continues to live on after the physical body has died. (As Parfitt points out,) The bodily criterion would only allow for a second life in the form of a physical resurrection or reincarnation. We certainly should not dismiss the position just because it is incompatible with ein truthday religions, though.There are more damning criticisms of the bodily criterion for identity, however. Our bodies are constantly changing- growing, take or regenerating cells, etc. So how much of our body must(prenominal)(prenomina l) stay the same in order for us to be classed as the same person we were several years ago? For example, a popular analogy was given which describes the philosopher John Lockes dearie equal of socks, which grow holes in from being worn so often. As the holes develop, Locke repairs them with patches. But after a opus of repairing his socks, none of the master copy material remains, and they are simply a patchwork of sore pieces of material (Where is this from?). The original debate, of which Lockes example was a variation, is that of the enrapture of Theseus, which has its pieces re lay one at a time, as necessary (Plutarch, p?). umpteen the great unwashed believe that, at some point, the Ship of Theseus loses too umteen of its original pieces and ceases to be the same ship that Theseus had returned from Crete in. Similarly, many believe that Lockes favourite pair of socks cease to exist when none of the original yarns are present. But, if we are to equate identity with the bodys cells, this position claims we must develop a new identity as our bodily cells change during our lifetime. This is a bizarre position to hold, as there would be no detectable change in our appearance or attitudePossible solutions to criticisms, and the success of these solutionsBut not e realone agrees that this is the case. Many people believe that the gradual change involved in the previous examples ensures that they retain their former identity. In the case of Lockes socks, the consensus tends to be that the resulting pair of socks are indeed the same as his favourite pair of socks, as this is the way we speak of things which have been repaired. Similarly, the gradual change of the Ship of Theseus ensures it retains its identity. As this pertains to the body, it suggests that, despite each of our cells being regenerated every ten years, this does not forbid us from remaining the same person. This means the gradual change of our bodys cells locomote within the acceptable limits of change, apparently saving the bodily criterion for identity.doubting Thomas Hobbes offered another variation upon this theme, whereby the ships planks ere replaced with aluminium (Hobbes, p.135?). The pieces removed from the ship were therefore reassembled to form a replica ship. But in this example, we are more given up to state that the replica ship which has been assembled from the original pieces is the same ship of Theseus, while the aluminium replacement is a replica.This is perhaps because a crucial part of the theory of bodily continuity is that it requires we maintain essentially the same transmittable structure. This makes the concept of bodily continuity highly supported by the sciences, which tend to view us as biological creatures governed by the physical reactions which find within our brains. A result of this is that, while our bodies could be perfectly merely entirely replicated in a metallic form, these robots would lack our genetic work out and woul d thus be a replica, rather than ourselves.Genetic determinism takes this position further, and claims that who we are is entirely dependent upon our genetics. Genetic determinists suggest that a clone and his original would have the exact same identities. The effect of genetics upon ones identity has been investigated by studies of monozygotic (identical) match, who are genetically identical. While studies of monozygotic and dizygotic twins have previously suggested that up to 50% of our temper is genetic (ref?), most twins tend to be raised in similar environments, devising it difficult to separate the influences of nature and nurture. But studies of monozygotic twins who have been raised separately indicate that only 20 to 25% of our personality is genetic in nature (Ewen, p. 73).So we have established that the gradual regeneration of our cells during our lives falls within the realms of acceptable change, whereas being replaced with a non-human body (for example, a metal one) does not.So where exactly are the boundaries for changes we deem to be acceptable? How much of our body could we lose without losing our identity? Bernard Williams describes the physical spectrum, where a persons body is replaced very gradually. He claims that this example is subject to the heap paradox. In the same way removing a grain from a heap does not stop it from being a heap, it seems that each change is too midget to change our identity. Yet by the end of it the persons body has been replaced with that of Napoleons.In this example, Williams describes the physical changes which occur to the subject of this experiment, but not the psychological effects. While his body has been replaced with that of Napoleons, he may well dormant maintain all the same character traits and memories we associate with his original self.While this is a very root example, it does have practical implications. If a certain amount of our body is unavoidable to stay the same for us to remain the sa me person, this raises questions about amputees and people who undergo extensive plastic surgery. For example, what if a man had his arms amputated, and then his legs? Would he still be the same man he was precedent to these operations? While he may now lack many of the skills he had before, it seems unfair to claim he is not the same man. What if he was somehow reduced to simply his head, though? Some claim that it is not the whole body which is required for continuity of the self, but a very small part of it the brain.This objection was raised by Sydney Shoemaker, who describes a eyeshot experiment regarding Brown and Robinson. Brown undergoes a brain transplant, and his brain is placed in the body of Robinson. When Robinsons body awakes, it remembers everything of Browns life, behaves like Brown, has the same beliefs as Brown, and nonetheless adopts all the mannerisms his family have come to associate with him. It seems that Brown and Robinsons family alike must agree that Rob insons body is now home to Browns identity.While this is a very extreme case, it does demonstrate that the body alone is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for the continuity.Eric Olson, however, defends the bodily criterion against this criticism, viewing the individual simply as a biological organism. He claims that humans can fend complete psychological change and remain the same as long as they are alive for.I disagree with this position, however. It seems to me that if you remove a persons personality, mannerisms, memories, dispositions, etc, you have removed that persons very identity. It seems to me that in considering the individual as a human animal, Olson oversimplifies the issue of identity. It is easy to say that the human being still exists despite this overhaul of their mental life, but it is very difficult to stand the claim that their personal identity has not been at all alter by this.R. B. Ewen, Personality, a topical approach theories, research, major controversies and emerging findings, Lawrence Earlbaum Associates Inc Publishers, crude Jersey, 1998.T. Hobbes and W. Moleworth, Elements of Philosophy, vol. 4 of The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, London, J. Bohn.J. Locke?H. Noonan, Personal Identity,E. Olsen, The Human physical Personal Identity Without Psychology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons,Plutarch, Lives, J. Langhorne and W. Langhorne (eds), Harpers and Brothers Publishers, New York, 1859.B. Williams